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COMPARABLE WORTH: THE NEXT STEP TOWARD PAY EquITY
UNDER TITLE VII
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, Congress took the first steps toward pay equity
between the sexes by enacting the Equal Pay Act' and Title VII. 2 Simply
requiring equal pay for equal work, as the Equal Pay Act provides, has
not remedied past economic wage disparities. In fact, current United
States Labor Department statistics reveal that women who held full-time
jobs in 1983 received only about two-thirds as much as their male coun-
terparts. 3 Judicial recognition of comparable worth claims is the next
step toward pay equity under Title VII.
There is no controversy that a wage gap exists; there is controversy
as to the reasons for its existence. Critics of comparable worth attribute
the wage gap to a number of non-discriminatory factors including age,
education and training, the type of work performed, job history, and
absenteeism. 4 However, after taking these factors into consideration,
there is still an unexplained differential between the wages paid to men
and those paid to women. This differential results from society's his-
toric devaluation of "women's work" and segregation of women into
specific occupations.
Although women work in a greater variety of professional fields
than in the past, women remain concentrated in predominantly female
occupations. In 1982, 99% of all secretaries, 96% of all nurses, and
82% of all elementary school teachers were women. 5 In 1983, women
accounted for 80% of all administrative support workers but only 8% of
precision production, craft and repair workers; 70% of retail and per-
sonal sales workers but only 32% of managers, administrators, and
executives .6
Advocates of comparable worth have called for judicial or legislative
intervention to redress the pay inequity resulting from job segregation.
The comparable worth doctrine requires equal pay for jobs that are
equal or comparable in value to an employer. The focus is on a single
employer and whether women, in predominantly female positions, are
being paid the same wage rate as men, in predominantly male positions,
when both types ofjobs are of equal value to their employer.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, WOMEN AT WORK: A CHARTBOOK
28-29 (April 1983) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN AT WORK].
4. See generally F. MORRIS,J. O'NEILL,J. CALHOON,J. SLOAN, S. MITCHELL, T. FAHNER,
JUDICIAL WAGE DETERMINATION . . . A VOLATILE SPECTRE: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARABLE
WORTH (1984) (discussing legal, economic, labor, independent business, corporate, and
state government perspectives on comparable worth).
5. WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 3, at 8-10.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WOMEN'S BUREAU, FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS (1984).
417
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
The comparable worth doctrine under Title VII mandates that sex,
like race, color, religion, or national origin, cannot be used by employ-
ers as a factor to discriminate in setting wages for employees. Employ-
ers violate Title VII whenever they pay women lower wages than men
because of sex. The issue of comparable worth is one of sex-based wage
discrimination, a traditional Title VII claim.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Comparable worth is not a new or untested idea. The issue first
surfaced in the United States 7 during World War I as women began
moving into jobs predominantly held by men.8 The needs of war pro-
duction created a drastic increase in the demand for workers both in the
military and in industry. As a result, a National War Labor Board was
created by executive order of the President for both World War I and
World War II. 9 The First War Labor Board established governmental
support for pay equity by issuing General Order 13, which prohibited
the lowering of wages for women doing work equal to men within a sin-
gle plant.1 0 However, at the end of the war, most women left the
workforce voluntarily, to assume the domestic role, or involuntarily,
either to be displaced by returning veterans or laid off as war production
slowed. " I
In January 1942, the Board was reestablished by Executive Order
9017 as a wartime measure.1 2 Although originally the War Labor Board
established the policy of equal pay for equal, or substantially equal, work
during World War II, the Board soon realized that sex-based disparities
existed between men and women holding different jobs. 13 Conse-
quently, the Second War Labor Board was used to ensure equal pay for
7. Comparable worth claims have been recognized in other countries. For example,
Canada and Great Britain have moved beyond the equal pay for equal work standard. In
order to combat sex-based wage discrimination, Great Britain prohibits pay disparity be-
tween men and women not only for equal work, but for work of equal value as well. Simi-
larly, Canada prohibits pay disparity between men and women for work of equal value.
Great Britain adopted its standard in 1970 and Canada adopted its standard in 1977.
While the judiciary and the legislatures in the United States struggle with the merits of
comparable worth claims, Great Britain and Canada have long since enforced the idea. See
generally Note, Beyond Equal Pay for Equal Work: Recent Developments in the United States, Great
Britain, and Canada, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 179 (1984) (discussion of the develop-
ments of comparable worth in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain).
8. A. COOK, COMPARABLE WORTH: THE PROBLEM AND STATES' APPROACHES TO WAGE
Equrr 1 (1983).
9. Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based lWage Discrimination, 69 IOWA L. REV.
655, 658 (1984). The Boards were established at the request of unions and management
in order to carry out the no strike/no lockout commitments and as a means of resolving
conflicts that could not be settled through bargaining. Id. at 658. See also Williams & Mc-
Dowell, The Legal Framework, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 195, 205
(R. Livernash ed. 1980).
10. A. CooK, supra note 8, at 1.
1I. Bellace, supra note 9, at 659.
12. Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But Equal "--Job Segregation and Pay Equity in the Wake
of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 269.
13. Id. at 270.
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jobs of comparable value. 14 The Board authorized "adjustments which
equalize[d] the wage or salary rates paid to females with the rates paid to
males for comparable quality and quantity of work on the same or simi-
lar operation."1 5 Trade unions supported the wage-setting principles of
the National War Labor Board, not out of a commitment to pay equity,
but because women and minorities had historically been a source of
cheap labor, and the unions feared the hard-won gains of union men
would be jeopardized. 
1 6
Several equal pay cases were brought before the War Board, 1 7 the
most famous being General Electric Co. and Westinghouse Electric Co. 18 The
union in that case argued that General Electric's job evaluation system
was arbitrarily applied and resulted in women not receiving the same
pay rate as men for work of comparable quality and quantity. In support
of that position the union cited a 1937 job manual, which stated that
"[f]or female operators, the value shall be two-thirds of the value for
adult male workers." 19 The company argued that since there was no
interchangeability ofjobs, women did not perform work equal to men.
20
The union also protested Westinghouse Electric's dual job evaluation
system where jobs were evaluated according to which sex performed
them.
2 '
In its decision the Board stated, first, that where women hold jobs
which are also performed by men, women are to receive equal pay with
men.2 2 It claimed that indirect costs of employing women, such as
higher rates of absenteeism and turnover, and lack of training in the
industry, would not be recognized as justifications for reducing wage
rates where no comparison of job content is made.2 3 Second, with re-
spect to adjustment of wage rates for women's jobs, wage differentiation
was presumed to be correct for jobs performed historically by women.
24
However, this presumption could be overcome by affirmative evidence
of unequal wage rates derived from a comparison of the content ofjobs
14. Williams & McDowell, supra note 9, at 205.
15. Thomas, Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, 34 LAB. L.J. 4 (1983) (quoting General
Order 16, adopted Nov. 24, 1942).
16. R. STEINBERG, WAGES AND HOURS: LABOR AND REFORM IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA
116-17 (1982). See also A. COOK, supra note 8, at 1.
17. The War Board did not act as a judicial or administrative body and it did not
implement legislative enactments. The Board had power to arbitrate and mediate disputes
only. For a discussion on the power and composition of the War Board, see Williams &
McDowell, supra note 9, at 206-07.
18. 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666 (1945). For a summary of the decision, see 17 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1667 (1945).
19. 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666.
20. Id.
21. Id. "We line women's jobs up with other women's jobs. We line men's jobs up
with men's jobs. We do not line women's jobs up against men's jobs." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. See also General Motors Co., 16 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1601 (1945) (wage differential
of 21 q per hour lowered to 6q per hour where the only decisional criterion could be the
difference in job content).
24. 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666.
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performed by men with the content of jobs performed by women. 25
The Board's decision clarified that the worth of a job must be based on
the job's content and not on the sex of the person performing that job.
A. The Equal Pay Act
Despite the early success of the equal pay and comparable worth
concepts during World War I and World War II, many years passed
before the federal government formally accepted wage equity for wo-
men. In 1963, section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act 2 6 was amended
to include one additional fair labor standard-equal pay for equal work
regardless of sex. 2 7 Under this amended provision, now known as the
Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof and must estab-
lish that the employer is paying workers of one sex more than workers of
the opposite sex in a situation where both sexes are performing the
same or similar work. The similarity of the work is established by dem-
onstrating that the skill, effort, and responsibility of both jobs are equal
and performed under similar working conditions.2 8
25. Id. For a discussion of this case, see Bellace, supra note 9, at 660; M. GOLD, A
DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 67 (1983); Newman & Vonhof, supra note 12, at 292-96.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982); see also U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1963, 688-89. The Equal Pay Act provides in pertinent part:
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . .between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees of such establishment at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for
equal work onjobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, responsi-
bility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex.
For legislative history of the provision, see U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess. 687-92 (1963).
27. "Equal pay for equal work" was not the standard initially proposed by the Ken-
nedy Administration in 1962. That proposal prohibited paying a lower wage to "any em-
ployee of the opposite sex for work of comparable character on a job the performance of
which requires comparable skills." Hearings on H.R. 8898 Before Selected Subcommittees.
Although support for the original language was strong among the Unions, arguments
against the bill presented by business representatives prevailed. The language was
changed to the equal work standard because it was constructed more narrowly. See H.R.
8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963). See also Note,
supra note 7, at 184.
28. The EEOC regulations define equal skill, effort, and responsibility as follows:
"'Skill" involves such factors as experience, training, education, and ability
and must be measured in terms of the performance requirements of the job. If
two jobs require essentially the same skill, both the jobs would be equal under the
Act even if the employee in one of the jobs is not required to exercise that skill as
frequently or during as much of the work period as the other. An employee's
possession of a skill not needed in the job cannot make two employees' jobs
unequal.
"Effort" relates to the physical or mental exertion needed for the perform-
ance of the job. Differences only in the kind of effort required will not justify
wage differentials. Although there are circumstances in which a differential may
be based on the fact that one employee has to perform lifting functions and
others do not, serious questions of good faith arise if the men on ajob receive the
differential regardless of their actual lifting activities.
"Responsibility" relates to the degree of accountability required in the per-
formance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation. Ex-
amples of differences in responsibility that may justify pay differentials include
the following: one employee of a group serves as relief supervisor whenever the
[Vol. 62:2
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If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the Equal Pay
Act, the burden shifts to the employer to justify wage differentials under
one of four affirmative defenses. These defenses include payment made
pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system measuring qual-
ity or quantity of production, or where the wage differential is based on
"any factor other than sex." 2 9 The first three defenses are very specific;
it is the fourth defense, the catch-all defense, which has created confu-
sion. Although questions remain as to what constitutes a "factor other
than sex," the Supreme Court has at least determined that market justifi-
cations, such as supply and demand, do not fall within it.
The only case under the Equal Pay Act to reach the Supreme Court,
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan,3 0 is most noted for its rejection of the
defense that market conditions are a factor other than sex. In Corning
Glass, male quality control inspectors on the night shift were paid more
than female quality control inspectors on the day shift, even though
both groups performed identical tasks. 3 1 Company officials claimed the
pay differential was intended to compensate for night work and was,
therefore, a factor other than sex. However, before this time, there was
no difference in pay between day and night shifts at Corning Glass
Works. This was the first time a plant-wide shift differential had been
established. 32 The Court held that non-discriminatory shift differentials
could exist, but that in this instance, Corning Glass had failed to prove
that the higher rate paid to night workers was intended solely as com-
pensation for night work rather than as additional payment based on
sex. 3 3 The Court found that the employer paid the higher wages as an
encouragement for men to perform work they perceived as women's
work, and therefore, demeaning. 34 The Court refused to accept market
justifications for differing the base pay rates between men and women
supervisor is absent and during these periods the relief supervisor is in training
for a supervisory position; one of several sales clerks is designated as responsible
for determining whether to accept payment by personal check. Some types of
additional responsibility are not sufficiently important to justify higher pay; for
example, turning off lights at the end of the day would not be enough.
See 29 C.F.R. § 800.122-129 (1984). See also COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, HARASSMENT
AND COMPENSATIONS-TODAYS SEX DISCRIMINATION ISSUES 12-13 (1981). "Working con-
ditions" are explained in COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, supra at 13, as follows:
According to the United States Supreme Court, industrial relations' definition of
"working conditions" at the time the Act was under consideration encompassed
two subfactors: surroundings and hazards. "Surroundings" refers to the ele-
ments, such as toxic chemicals or fumes, that are regularly encountered by the
worker and takes into account the intensity and frequency of such encounters.
"Hazards" includes the physical hazards regularly encountered, their frequency,
and the severity of injury they can cause. Time of day is not a factor included
within the term "working conditions."
29. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(iv).
30. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
31. Id. Originally, New York and Pennsylvania had laws prohibiting women from
working at night. The inspection work was performed during the day until automatic pro-
duction equipment made it possible to also do the work at night. Male inspectors were
subsequently hired to perform the evening inspections. Id. at 191.
32. Id. at 192.
33. Id. at 204.
34. Id. at 191-92 n.3.
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for identical jobs. 3 5 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected market condi-
tions as a factor other than sex where equal work is performed.
36
B. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 3 7 forbids discrimination in
all aspects of employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 38 It is far broader and more comprehensive than the
Equal Pay Act, which applies only to wages and wage differentials be-
35. Id. at 205. "The differential arose simply because men would not work at the low
rates paid women inspectors, and it reflected a job market in which Corning could pay
women less than men for the same work. That the company took advantage of such a
situation may be understandable as a matter of economics, but its differential nevertheless
became illegal .. " Id.
36. Other courts have continued to reject the marketplace defense. See, e.g., Brennan
v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen.
Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970); Shulte v. Wilson Indus., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.
Tex. 1982). For a discussion of these cases, see Pauley, The Exception Swallows the Rule:
Market Conditions as a "Factor Other Then Sex" in Title VII Disparate Impact Litigation, 86 W. VA.
L. REV. 165, 170-72 (1983).
37. Title VII provides:
It shall be unlawful employment for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
38. Originally, Title VII was intended to eliminate employment discrimination among
blacks and ethnic minorities. The original bill prohibited discrimination based on race,
creed, or color. During a discussion regarding the inclusion of the word "age" in Title
VII, Rep. Ryan of New York stated: "We have failed repeatedly to face the crucial issue,
and that is whether or not it is time for us to declare as a matter of national policy that
there shall be no discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color." 110 CONG. REC.
2603 (1964).
Rep. Howard Smith of Virginia offered the Amendment including "sex" on February
8, 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964). Smith, in support of the amendment, read a letter
from a constituent who was concerned about the "imbalance" of men to women as re-
corded by the 1960 census. The letter stated, "[J]ust why the Creator would set up such
an imbalance of spinsters, shutting off their [sic] 'right' of every female to have a husband
of her own is, of course, known only to nature." Id. Smith agreed with the injustice and
read the letter "just to illustrate that women have some real grievances and some real
rights to protect." Id.
Some critics claim the word "sex" was inserted hastily by Smith in an effort to prevent
the passage of Title VII. See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880-82 (1967). This claim is supported by legislative history,
in particular, remarks made by Rep. Green during House debates. In addressing the
House, Rep. Green stated: "[The amendment] will clutter up the bill and it may-very
well-be used to help destroy this section of the bill by some of the people who today
support it." 110 CONG. REc. 2581 (1964).
Ultimately, a comparison of the black employed women's and the white employed
women's remedies for wage discrimination was the source of most of the discussion. The
fact that black women would have a cause of action for discrimination in employment
based on race but white women would have no such redress for employment discrimina-
tion caused concern. Clearly, it was the argument that white women would be at the "bot-
tom of the barrel," below black women in particular, with respect to equal employment




tween men and women. In order to achieve equal employment opportu-
nities, Title VII proscribes overt discriminatory practices as well as
facially neutral practices that are discriminatory in effect. 39 Title VII fol-
lowed so closely on the heels of the Equal Pay Act that concern about
conformity between the two laws, and about preserving the efficacy of
the Equal Pay Act, led to the Senate's introduction of an amendment to
the bill.
40
C. The Bennett Amendment
The purpose of the Bennett Amendment was to resolve the antici-
pated conflict between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 4 1 The Amend-
ment became a contested issue that sharply divided the lower courts in
their resolution of sex-based wage discrimination claims.
The text of the Bennett Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful practice under this title for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the
amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to em-
ployees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by
the (Equal Pay Act).
4 2
The meaning of the word "authorized" created the controversy in the
lower courts. One theory interpreted the phrase "authorized by the
(Equal Pay Act)" as incorporating only the four defenses of the Equal
Pay Act into Title VII, 4 3 while the other theory incorporated the four
defenses and, in addition, restricted Title VII's coverage to the equal
pay for equal work standard.
4 4
The controversy over the Bennett Amendment was resolved by the
Supreme Court in County of Washington v. Gunther.4 5 Gunther held that the
Bennett Amendment did not limit Title VII's protections against sex-
based wage discrimination to claims of equal pay for equal work as pre-
scribed by the Equal Pay Act. 46 In reaching this decision, the Court re-
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). "The Act proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."
Id. at 431.
40. The House approved the incorporation of the word "sex" and sent the bill to the
full Senate for consideration. It was at this level that concern for the conformity of the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII grew. Senator Bennett proposed an amendment in response
to this concern. 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964).
41. "The purpose of [this] amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified." Id. For a discussion of the limited
legislative history of the Bennett Amendment, see Newman & Vonhof, supra note 12, at
277-79.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(h) (emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631
F.2d 1094, 1099-1107 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
44. See, e.g., Lemons v. City and Cty. of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 888 (1980).
45. 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (female prison guards paid less than male prison guards for
substantially equal work could raise claims under Title VII). For a discussion of the facts,
procedural history, and Supreme Court decision in Gunther, see Newman & Vonhof, supra
note 12, at 274-77.
46. 452 U.S. at 181.
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lied on the language of the amendment itself and upon its recognition
that the denial of Title VII protection is appropriate only to the extent
that the Equal Pay Act has "authorized" pay differentials. By determin-
ing that the word "authorized" normally denotes an affirmative enabling
action, the Court was able to focus upon the wage practices that were
affirmatively authorized by the Equal Pay Act. 4 7 Thus, the Court held
that only the four defenses of the Equal Pay Act "authorized" pay differ-
entials unprotected by Title VII, while the rest of Title VII remained
intact.
4 8
Although the Gunther Court did not discuss the issue of comparable
worth, 49 it left open the possibility that Title VII protection is available
in comparable worth claims. Claims under the Equal Pay Act must be
based on pay differentials between men and women for the same job.50
Comparable worth is properly focused upon the disparity in the earn-
ings gap which is left unprotected by the Equal Pay Act.
5 1
II. PROVING THE WAGE GAP
The existence of a wage gap is not in dispute. The statistics illus-
trate that women earn, on the average, approximately 60% of what men
earn. 52 What is in dispute is the cause of the wage gap. In theory, the
argument against comparable worth seems plausible; the wage gap is
attributed to factors other than sex-based discrimination. However,
data regarding the existence and cause of the wage gap is available to
counter the critics.
Not all of the wage gap may be attributed to wage discrimination;
some non-discriminatory factors contribute to wage disparity between
men and women. Non-discriminatory factors include, among others,
age, education, job training, job history and seniority, type of work per-
formed, risks involved, wage conditions, and absenteeism. Taking these
factors into consideration, available data still leave a large portion of the
47. Id. at 169.
48. Id. at 168-69. "We therefore conclude that only differentials attributable to the
four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act are authorized by that Act within the mean-
ing of. . .Title VII." Id. at 171.
49. The Court cautioned that it was not deciding "the precise contours of lawsuits
challenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII" and that because the
comparable worth issue was not raised under the facts of the case it was not required to
"make its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs.
Id. at 181.
50. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
51. See Newman & Vonhof, supra note 12, at 300, where the authors comment that the
Equal Pay Act may have exacerbated occupational segregation by encouraging employers
to segregate women so as to keep their wages down and be able to avoid equal pay claims.
"If an employer wants to keep labor costs low, therefore, it can do so with less fear of
detection by isolating a group of workers, assigning them to different jobs, and devaluing
their wages, than it can by paying them lower wages for equal work." Id.
52. The earnings differential has fluctuated over the past thirty years. In 1956, fully
employed women's earnings were 63% of men's earnings. Fourteen years later, in 1970,
they had decreased to 59% of men's earnings. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., TIME OF CHANGE: 1983




In a study commissioned by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was asked to de-
termine if wage differentials, for work of comparable value, vary as to
the sex of the worker.54 The study summarized the findings from sev-
eral other studies and examines two explanations for the wage gap:
1) characteristics of workers; 2) characteristics of jobs.
5 5
The first explanation, characteristics of workers, considers the dif-
ferences that affect the productivity, education and training, work expe-
rience, continuity of work history, and health. 56 The NAS determined
that the empirical data consistently found a substantial part of the wage
gap could not be explained by non-discriminatory factors measuring
productivity differences. 5 7 The committee concluded that such results
created a presumption of additional factors, including discrimination, af-
fecting pay disparity between men and women.
58
The second explanation scrutinized by the committee concluded
that the pay disparity between men and women resulted from the char-
acteristics of the jobs they hold.5 9 Included within these characteristics
are prestige of job, authority exercised, and percent female. 60 Citing a
1974 study, the Committee stated "[n]ot only do women do different
work than [sic] men, but also the work women do is paid less, and the
more an occupation is dominated by women the less it pays." 6 1 The
Committee concluded that the sex composition ofjobs, independent of
the personal or job characteristics, strongly influences the earnings of a
worker within an occupation.
6 2
Finding that only a small part of pay disparity may be attributed to
the differences in education, experience, commitment or other personal
characteristics of employees, 6 3 and that the level of job segregation by
sex may be, in part, a result of discriminatory practices, the committee
53. Id. at 87.
54. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FORJOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 61 (D. Trie-
man & H. Hartman, eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES] (The
study addressed discrimination within the single firm and not a systematic solution to un-
intentional discrimination. The study focused on the inequalities between men and wo-
men rather than between whites and non-whites because the pay disparity is greater
between the sexes. Moreover, the pay disparity between men and women has increased
while the pay disparity between whites and non-whites has decreased over the years.).
55. Id at 16-17.
56. Id. at 18.
57. Id. at 17-24.
58. Id. at 24. The Committee did, however, recognize that the studies surveyed may
have contained flaws, and consequently, stated that they were to be suggestive of the find-
ing rather than definitive. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 31.
61. Id. at 28 (citing Sommers, Occupational Rankings for mn and Women By Earnings, 97
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 34-51 (Aug. 1974)).
62. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 54, at 30-31.
63. "The findings from studies attempting to explain the differences in earnings be-
tween men and women on the basis of such factors usually account for less than a quarter
and never more than half of the observed earnings differences," Id. at 42.
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concluded that substantial discrimination in pay exists. 64 The Commit-
tee suggested that job evaluation plans be used to identify and eliminate
discriminatory effects of pay disparity among jobs within a firm.
6 5
Other data concerning the wage gap are available in the findings of
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics conducted by the University of
Michigan's Institute for Social Research (1978).66 Five thousand house-
holds were the subjects of the study which focused specifically upon per-
sons in the workforce who were between the ages of 18 and 34. The
panel analyzed the impact of formal education, labor force attachment,
work history, and years of training in the current job on four groups:
white men, white women, black men, and black women. These four
groups included married and unmarried men, married women, and un-
married women who were heads of households.
The findings revealed several important facts. First, formal educa-
tion had little impact on wages for white women, moderate impact for
black women, and substantial impact for black men.6 7 The study indi-
cated that only 2% of the wage gap between white men and white wo-
men could be attributed to the difference in education. The factor of
education explained 11% of the gap between white men and black wo-
men and 39% of the gap between white men and black men. 68 The fact
still remains that fulltime working women earn substantially less than
similarly employed men with equivalent educations. 69
The attachment of an employee to the workforce has been cited by
critics of comparable worth as one of the major factors causing the wage
gap. 70 Tested factors of labor force attachment are: absenteeism as a
result of one's own illness or the illness of another; self-imposed restric-
tions on hours of work a day and on location of work; and plans to
quit.7 1 Although women have a lower attachment to the workforce than
men, this difference accounts for very little, if any, of the earnings gap. 72
Even though the level of labor force attachment may fluctuate between
women, the pay remains substantially the same.7 3 Consequently, wo-
64. Id. at 91. "[Ilt is ... true in many instances that jobs held mainly by women and
minorities pay less at least in part because they are held mainly by women and minorities."
Id. at 93 (emphasis in the original).
65. Although the Committee admitted that job evaluation plans contain built-in bi-
ases, it still encouraged their use as the only acceptable method of achieving pay equity.
Id. at 95-96. See also infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
66. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, PANEL STUDY OF IN-
COME DYNAMICS, FIVE THOUSAND FAMILIES: PATrERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1978), re-
viewed by TIME FOR CHANGE, supra note 52, at 88-90.
67. Id. at 88.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 98. In 1981, over half the women with a college degree had incomes slightly
higher than the median for men completing the eighth grade. Id.
70. See, e.g., M. GOLD, supra note 25, at 3-19.
71. Time for Change, supra note 52, at 88.
72. Labor force attachment explains only 2% of the differences between white men
and white women and negatively influences the difference between white men and black




men with a high labor force attachment earn about as much as women
with lower attachment levels.
The panel found the single factor with the largest impact on the
wage gap was work history. Work history, along with the closely related
factor of years of training on the current job, accounted for 38% of the
wage gap for white women, 22% for black women, and 18% for black
men.74 Two elements in the work history category explained the largest
part of the gap: length of employment with the present employer and
years of training completed at the present job.
75
In theory, much of the wage gap may be explained by the fact that
women have less continuous employment than men. Women lose sen-
iority and acquisition of important skills by interrupting their work.
However, the study concluded that in reality, staying out of the work
force has little significant or direct impact on women's wages. 76 In fact,
white women with frequent work interruptions (two or more) earned
practically the same hourly wage as those women with similar work ex-
perience and fewer interruptions in employment.
77
Both the NAS study and the Michigan study enumerate several neu-
tral factors, such as age, education, training, job tenure, seniority, and
amount and location of work done, that affect the wage gap. Relevant
data acknowledge that a higher percentage of women work in part-time
jobs, 78 a lower percentage of women are union members, and that
men's work weeks are usually longer. 79 Even so, taking all these factors
into consideration, there is still an unexplained proportion of the wage
gap between men and women.8 0 The United States Labor Department
concluded that "[t]his unexplained difference can be attributed to sex
discrimination." 8' The NAS acknowledged the argument that the high
74. Id.
75. Id. at 90. On-the-job training explained 10% of the wage gap between white wo-
men and white men, and 15% for black men and white men. Years of continuous employ-
ment explained 12% of the gap for white women and 9% for black women. This is due to




78. Although it is true that women in the work force are more likely to work part-time
than men, it is important to note that there is no overall pay disparity with respect to part-
time work between men and women. Most men who work part-time are either between the
ages of 16 and 19 years old or over 55 years old. Whereas a large number of women
employed part-time are between the ages of 25 and 54. Labor statistics published by the
United States Department of Labor in 1982 indicated that women who work part-time
have achieved pay equity with men working part-time; both groups receiving about the
minimum wage. The difference in median hourly wages between full-time working men
and part-time working men was large-$6.25 and $3.20 respectively. Women's wages, on
the other hand, showed very little difference between full-time and part-time median
wages-$3.98 and $3.21 respectively. Unlike men, women receive approximately the min-
imum wage for the work they perform, regardless of whether it is full-time or part-time.
TIME FOR CHANGE, supra note 52, at 92-93 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB.
STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT EARNINGS (March 1982)).
79. TIME FOR CHANGE, supra note 52, at 88.
80. Id. See also Pauley, supra note 36, at 167 (Neutral factors reduce the wage gap but
there is still a 34% unexplained differential between men and women in the work force).
81. TIME: FOR CHANGE, supra note 52, at 87.
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concentration of women in lower-paying jobs often results, in part, be-
cause women choose these jobs for a variety of reasons usually related to
family obligations.8 2 However, the NAS concluded that the high con-
centration of women in lower-paying jobs also results from "the exclu-
sionary practices of employers and from the systematic underpayment of
jobs held mainly by women."
8 3
The findings of the NAS and the United States Labor Department
not only support the actual existence of the wage gap but also bolster
the conclusion that sex-based discrimination is one of the primary
causes of the wage gap.
III. PROVING A TITLE VII WAGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
The Supreme Court's decision in Gunther affirmatively settled the
issue of whether Title VII applies to wage discrimination claims when
male and female jobs are dissimilar, but left unanswered how such
claims were to be proved.8 4 In order to promote Title VII's broad pro-
hibition of discriminatory employment practices,8 5 the standard Title
VII burdens and modes of proof should apply in the wage discrimina-
tion context as well.
8 6
There are two theories available to a plaintiff to prove a Title VII
case, disparate treatment and disparate impact.8 7 A disparate treatment
case involves a situation where an employer treats an individual pro-
tected by Title VII differently simply because of the person's minority
status, religion, or sex. A treatment case, unlike an impact case, necessi-
tates proving the employer's intent to discriminate. Such intent, how-
ever, can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.8 8 Once a plaintiff
has introduced evidence from which it appears more likely than not that
the defendant had an intent to discriminate, a prima facie treatment case
is established.8 9 An employer will be liable unless it can "articulate"
reasons which justify disparate treatment. 90 If an employer does articu-
late legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for disparate treatment, the
employee can then show that these reasons were merely a pretext to
82. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 54, at 53-54.
83. Id. at 65.
84. The Gunther Court declined to determine what may constitute a prima facie case or
to lay down standards for litigation of the case on remand. On remand, the case settled
prior to trial for a $3,250 payment to four former jail matrons and $26,000 in attorney's
fees. See 954 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 33 (March 15, 1982).
85. As Congress itself has indicated, a "broad approach" to the definition of equal
employment opportunity is essential to overcoming and undoing the effect of discrimina-
tion. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964).
86. Cf Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1083 (1982) (disparate impact analysis should not be used in comparable
worth claims).
87. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
88. Id. A pattern of treatment supports an inference of intentional discrimination
such as substantial disparaties in the rates of hire of minority as compared with nonmi-
nority groups. United States v. Hazlewood School Dist., 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
89. Mc1)onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
90. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
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hide bias. 9 '
In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff must show that some facially
neutral employment practice has a substantially disproportionate impact
upon a group protected by Title VII. 9 2 Under this theory, "practice,
procedures, or tests neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employ-
ment practices." '9 3 Examples of such outwardly neutral employment
practices include height and weight requirements, 94 or certain types of
employment tests adversely affecting the job opportunities of those of
certain ethnic or cultural backgrounds. 95 Once a plaintiff has shown the
existence and impact of such a practice, the employer will be held liable
unless the practice can be justified by "business necessity."
96
A. Disparate Treatment Wage Discrimination Claims
The majority of wage discrimination cases decided to date have pro-
ceeded under a Title VII disparate treatment theory. In these cases, the
degree of similarity between men's and women's jobs is not considered
relevant; what is relevant is the fact that an employer intentionally set
women's wages lower than men's wages for jobs which are of equal
value to the employer. The courts have held that discriminatory intent,
in the wage discrimination setting, can be inferred from proof of sex-
based deviation from job evaluation studies and other traditional means
of proving Title VII discrimination.
9 7
1. Job evaluation studies as proof of disparate treatment
Job evaluation studies have been utilized in the employment setting
to compare, rank, and set wages for jobs, from as early as the 1940's by
the War Labor Board and consistently by courts and employers through
implementation of the Equal Pay Act.98 In a study ofjob evaluation sys-
91. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
92. This theory was first articulated by ChiefJustice Burger in Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
93. Id. at 430.
94. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements
for prison guard positions disproportionately excluded 50% of the women from consider-
ation for employment, compared to 1% of the male population).
95. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (effect of non-job related testing and educational require-
ments was to deny employment opportunities to otherwise qualified blacks who, through-
out their lives, had been the victims of discriminatory educational systems).
96. id. at 43i.
97. Testimony by Winn Newman and Christine Owens before the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights Consultation on Comparable Worth Panel on Legislative Perspec-
tive and Precedents, (June 6-7, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Testimony by Newman and
Owens]. Newman and Owens contended that a showing of sex discrimination in the ad-
ministration of various aspects of the employment relationship, such as discriminatory job
assignments and classifications, is evidence of sex-based wage discrimination. They also
supported the use of statistical evidence by itself or in conjunction with other types of
evidence to prove sex-based wage discrimination.
98. Under the Equal Pay Act, jobs are evaluated to determine if they are "substantially
similar" based on factors of skill, effort, responsibility, and similar working conditions. See
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
The Supreme Court noted the importance ofjob evaluations in employment discrimi-
nation suits in Coming Glass, emphasizing that Congress' intent was "to incorporate into
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tems in the United States, the EEOC found four major types: 1) a rank-
ing system; 2) a classification system; 3) a factor comparison system; and
4) a point method approach. 99 Although there are several types of job
evaluation systems, almost all show a similar methodology: the first step
involves a careful description of each job within the unit being evaluated
(the entire firm, a particular plant, or a division within the plant); the
second step evaluates each job with respect to its "worth" to the organi-
zation, and ranks all the jobs accordingly; the third step uses the results
of the job evaluation in the setting of wage or salary rates. 100
Job evaluation results are useful, competent, and relevant evidence
in employment discrimination cases. 10 1 Sex-based deviation from job
evaluation studies in the establishment of wage rates is especially proba-
tive of intentional discrimination. Gunther,10 2 the only Supreme Court
decision which has mentioned the comparable worth theory, made it
clear that proof of intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII
could be inferred from an employer's deviation from job evaluation re-
sults.' 0 3 The case involved a dispute regarding a county's evaluation of
the worth of the jobs of female matrons and male guards at the county
jail. The county determined that female matrons should be paid 95% of
what male guards earned. Notwithstanding that determination, the fe-
males were compensated only at 70% of the male wage. The males, on
the other hand, were paid the full evaluated worth of their jobs.'0 4 The
Court recognized that a claim of discriminatory undercompensation
under Title VII could be proved by the failure of the county to pay the
female matrons their full evaluated wage rate.
10 5
The Third Circuit in International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westing-
house Electric Corp. ,106 has held that sex-based wage differentials would
violate Title VII where the employer deviated from job evaluation re-
sults along pronounced sex-based lines for jobs involving comparable,
rather than equal, work. Wage rates for jobs filled predominantly by
females were set lower than jobs filled predominantly by males despite
the fact that the jobs had been rated equally with respect to the knowl-
edge and training required, and the specific demands and responsibili-
ties of the job.'0 7 The court held that Westinghouse could not create
[the Equal Pay Act] the well-defined and well-accepted principles ofjob evaluation so as to
ensure that wage differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans would be outside
the purview of the Act." 417 U.S. at 201.
99. See NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci., JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW, INTERIM RE-
PORT TO THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 39-48 (June 1979).
100. Id. See also A. COOK, supra note 8, at 13-14; D. THOMPSEN, Principlesfor Design and
Audit of Job Evaluation Plans in MANUAL ON PAY EQUITY 109 (J. Grune ed. 1980).
101. Cf Bellace, supra note 9, at 671-79 (a difficulty with litigating comparable worth
cases is judicial unfamiliarity with job evaluation and wage setting).
102. 452 U.S. 161. See also supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
103. 452 U.S. at 181.
104. Id. at 180-81.
105. Id. at 181.
106. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
107. Id. at 1097. The particular wage structure challenged embodied a deliberately
discriminatory policy of an earlier plan which maintained sex-segregated wage scales. Id.
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job classifications whereby wages were paid to one group solely because
of considerations of religion, race, national origin or sex.
10 8
Two other cases demonstrate the propriety of using job evaluation
results as a test for comparing dissimilar jobs and setting wages. In
Briggs v. City of Madison, 10 9 the court set forth a prima facie case of Title
VII wage discrimination which comprised, inter alia, a job evaluation
study. The Court held that a plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of
a protected class, (2) occupying a sex-segregated job classification,
(3) that is paid less than, (4) a sex-segregated job classification occupied
by men, and (5) that the two job classifications at issue are so similar in
their requirements of skill, effort, and responsibility and in their working
conditions that it can reasonably be inferred that they are of comparable
value to an employer.' 10 And, in Connecticut Employees Association v. Con-
necticut,''' the court held that the state intentionally discriminates
against female employees in violation of Title VII when it pays female
employees at lower rates of compensation for work the state has deter-
mined to be of comparable or equal value to the work performed by
men.
The cases which have found job evaluations to be useful in wage
discrimination cases demonstrate that job evaluation studies have been
and can continue to be manageable in the courts. Furthermore, when
the employer has deviated from its own self-evaluation, the evidence of
intentional discrimination in setting wages is particularly compelling. If
the premise of these cases is that an employer is liable because it con-
ductedjob evaluations that compared job worth and found wage dispari-
ties based on sex, the question arises whether an employer can avoid
liability by simply not conducting any evaluations. 112 Such a practice
would run counter to Title VII's broad remedial purposes and should be
curbed. Commentators have raised two proposals which would en-
courage judicial use ofjob evaluation studies to ascertain Title VII viola-
tions in the absence of an employer conducted study.'13
First, a standard methodology for conducting job evaluations
should be established so that courts could takejudicial notice of the pro-
108. Id. The court stated the issue in the case was "whether Congress intended to per-
mit Westinghouse to willfully discriminate against women in a way in which it could not
discriminate against blacks or whites, Jews or Gentiles, Protestants or Catholics. Italians or
Irish, or any other group protected by [Title VIII." Id.
109. 536 F. Supp. 435 (1982).
110. Id. at 455. Although the plaintiffs, public health nurses, all of whom were women,
proved a prima facie case of discriminatory undercompensation in comparison to male
sanitarian workers, the court found that the defendants rebutted such proof and the plain-
tiffs failed to prove pretext.
111. 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 191 (D.C. Conn. 1983).
112. Some commentators state that "an increasing number of attorneys are advising
employer-clients, with some good reason, not to study their compensation systems at all or
to do so in utmost secrecy." Siniscalco & Remmers, Comparable WIorth in the Aftermath of
AFSCME v. State of Wash., 10-1 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J 6, 22 (1984).
113. See Failure to Adopt Comparable Worth Pay Plan After State Was on Notice of Discrimina-
tion, 115 LAB. REL. REP. ANALYSIS 1, 4 (January 2, 1984).
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cess; 114 courts would be less reluctant to adopt a comparable worth pol-
icy based on sophisticated well-tested job evaluation studies.
l 15
Although the research and methodology for a bias-free job evaluation
system are in the infant stage, 1 6 a common methodology can be devel-
oped from synthesizing a number of existing or proposed methodolo-
gies. Job evaluations have been used by practically every large employer
to evaluate the worth or grade level of job classifications.' 17 Some
eighty-five state and local governments either have studied or have actu-
ally implemented pay equity."18 The federal government requires a uni-
form classification system for all government employees. 119
Comparable worth legislation has been proposed in Congress which en-
courages the development and use of equitable job evaluation tech-
niques.12 0 These efforts to provide workable, independent, bias-free job
114. Id. at 4 (citing United Steelworkers of Amer. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 n.l
(1979) ("Judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to
make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice.")).
115. It is recognized that courts are reluctant to assume the task of evaluating jobs and
setting wage rates. See Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983) (court
refused to make an "essentially subjective" assessment of the value of the differing duties
of males and females in comparable jobs); Lemons, 620 F.2d at 229 ("[T]his would be a
whole new world for the courts, and until some better signal from Congress is received we
cannot venture into it."); Power v. Barry Cty., 539 F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
("This court cannot, and will not, evaluate different jobs and determine their worth to an
employer or to society and then, on that basis alone, determine whether Title VII or the
Equal Pay Act as been violated.").
116. See Valez & Buitenbeck, Comparable Worth and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
10-1 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 31, 32-35 (1984).
117. Winn Newman, Statement to the Equal Pay Joint Committee of Iowa 6 (Nov. 17, 1982).
See also T. PATrERSON, JOB EVALUATION Xi (1972) ("Almost two thirds of the adult popula-
tion in the United States are pay graded by job evaluation schemes.").
118. To date, twenty states have adopted legislation defining pay equity in terms of
"comparable worth" or "equal value." Sixteen states apply comparable worth legislation
to all employees and four states apply it only to state employees.
The states with comparable worth legislation for all employees are: Alaska, Arkansas,
Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See ALA. STAT. § 18-
80.220 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-624 (1976); GA. CODE §§ 34-5-1, 34-2-3 (1981);
IDAHO CODE § 44.1702 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 337.423 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
28, § 628 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 55A (1979); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149,
§ 105A (Michie/Law. Coop. 1976 & Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1219 (1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 34-06.1-01, 34-06.1-03 (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1 (West.
Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (1983) (all employees), § 240.190 (1983) (state
employees); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 60-12-15 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202
(1983); W. VA. CODE § 21-513-3 (1981). Four states, California, Minnesota, Montana, and
Washington, have comparable worth legislation for state employees only. See CAL. Gov.
CODE § 19827.2 (West Supp. 1984); MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 2-18-208, -209, 39-3-104
(1983); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.06.150, 41.06.155 (Supp. 1984-85). For discussion of the
status of comparable worth in eight states, see A. CooK, supra note 8, at 32-66.
119. See Siniscalco & Remmers, Nonjudicial Developments in Comparable Worth, 10-2 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 222, 235 (1984) (citing Beyond Equal Payfor Equal Work, Bus. WK.,July 18,
1983, at 169).
Such studies of public employees have found a consistent wage disparity between
predominantly male and predominantly female jobs ranging from fifteen to
thirty-five percent. Studies in Connecticut, Washington, and Wisconsin prove a
twenty percent wage disparity based upon sex segregation in jobs requiring
equivalent skill, effort, and responsibility.
120. See S.1900, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). Senator Alan Cranston introduced the
Pay Equity Act of 1983 which would "require the executive branch to enforce applicable
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evaluation studies should be beneficial to the courts. Judicial notice of a
national standard for job evaluation studies would allow courts to infer
wage discrimination from an employer's situation with respect to an ob-
jective standard. 12'
A second proposal for judicial action when an employer decides not
to voluntarily conduct a job evaluation study urges that the courts treat
the employer's failure to conduct such a study as an indication of the
employer's belief that such a study would reveal that wage discrimina-
tion does in fact exist. 12 2 The courts could infer discriminatory intent
from the employer's failure to conduct a study and prima facie liability
under Title VII could be established. 12 3 Employers would therefore be
liable in two ways: first, if the result of a voluntarily conducted study
showed women were underpaid; and second, if the employer refused to
carry out such a study.' 24 Once a prima facie case of underpayment is
shown, an employer could avoid liability only by conducting a study
which shows that wages are properly adjusted for certain job
classifications. 1
25
equal employment opportunity laws and directives so as to promote pay equity and elimi-
nate wage-setting practices which discriminate on the basis of sex, race, or ethnicity and
result in discriminatory wage differentials." A provision of the Act discusses job evalua-
tion studies as follows:
Sec. 2(a) The Congress finds that-
(8) objective job evaluation techniques now exist which are utilized by
many public and private employers to determine the comparative value
of different jobs through a system which numerically rates the basic fea-
tures and requirements of a particularjob, and additional efforts should
be made to develop, improve, and implement these techniques so as to
help eliminate discriminatory wage-setting practices and wage
differentials.
129 CONG. REC. S13,095-101 (daily ed. September 28, 1983). See also H.R. 5092, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), introduced by Rep. Mary Rose Oaker, which was designed to effec-
tuate pay equity for employees in the private and public sector alike. 130 CONG. REC.
H1426-27 (daily ed. March 8, 1984).
121. Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at 23-24, explained how courts
could use job evaluation results in proving wage discrimination:
Analytically, the role of job evaluations in proving wage discrimination claims is
similar to the role of seniority or employee selection devices in other Title VII
contexts. All three form an objective backdrop against which employment related
decisions may be assessed to determine whether prohibited discrimination has
occurred. By way of example: if more senior blacks are routinely passed over for
advancement, while less senior whites obtain promotions, courts infer race dis-
crimination because on the basis of objective criterion, i.e.. seniority, blacks are
treated less favorably than whites. Similarly, if blacks who satisfy certain em-
ployee selection criteria are denied employment opportunities while whites do
not satisfy those criteria (or do not fare as well on them) obtain those opportuni-
ties, courts again infer discrimination. By the same token, where on the basis of
an objective job measure-i.e., skill, effort and responsibility-women's jobs
which are consistently rated equal to or higher than those of men nonetheless
carry a lower pay rate, it is reasonable to infer wage discrimination thereby shift-
ing to the employer the burden of justifying that differential.
122. See LAB. REL. REP., supra note 113, at 4.
123. Id. See, e.g., Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602
(1981) (intent to discriminate inferred from failure to evaluate value of jobs).
124. LAB. REL. REP., supra note 113, at 4.
125. Id.
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B. Traditional Means of Proving Title VII Wage Discrimination Claims
Aside from the theory that job evaluation studies can provide pow-
erful evidence of wage discrimination, traditional means of proving dis-
crimination are equally effective in proving sex-based wage
discrimination. A showing of discriminatory job assignments, classifica-
tions or other practices in the administration of an employment relation-
ship provides circumstantial evidence of an intent to discriminate.
12 6
For example, in Taylor v. Charley Brothers Co.,127 the court inferred the
existence of the employer's discriminatory intent in setting women's
wage rates lower than men's, from proof that the employer maintained a
pattern and practice of classifying jobs by sex, hired and assigned jobs in
a segregated fashion, deprived women of full-time wages and seniority
rights by employing them on a "part-time" or "temporary basis," and
failed to undertake ajob evaluation study for determining values ofjobs.
The fact that the employer also did not pay men and women equal pay
for equal work was an additional demonstration of discriminatory
intent. 128
Similarly, in Fanegan-Grimms v. Library Association of Portland,129 a
prima facie case of disparate treatment in setting compensation was
proved by evidence of sex-based job segregation where female bookmo-
bile drivers were historically paid less than male delivery truck drivers.
Although the jobs were similar, a female bookmobile driver demon-
strated that even if she were "to achieve the highest pay scale in her
classification, she would still receive less pay than delivery truck drivers,
no matter how many years of seniority she achieved."'
3 0
Discriminatory intent, resulting in Title VII violations, has also been
inferred from the extremely low number of women who held manage-
ment positions in a corporation;' 3 ' from initial assignment discrimina-
tion and thereafter discrimination in promotions, transfers, and pay;'
3 2
and from maintaining sex-based classifications resulting in lower wages
for women. 1
33
Finally, statistical evidence of a pattern of treatment in an employ-
ment relationship should lead toward an inference of sex-based wage
discrimination. 134 In AFSCME v. State of Washington, 13 5 the district court
126. See Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at Iba.
127. 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (1981).
128. See Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at 17 n.22, "Evidence of
Equal Pay violations is extremely compelling evidence of wage discrimination in other wo-
men's jobs. . . . [I]f an employer pays women less than men when they are performing
precisely the same job, then surely he will pay women less, because of their sex when jobs
differ."
129. 560 F. Supp. 486 (D. Or. 1983).
130. Id. at 494.
131. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
132. See Carpenter v. Stephen F. Justin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g
denied, 712 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir. 1983). Contra Brooks v. Ashtabula Cty. Welfare Dept., 717
F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1983); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 585 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D.
Ala. 1984).
133. See Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
134. See Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at 10. Statistics are particu-
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found that the state had intentionally engaged in "institutional" and sys-
tematic discrimination in pay against state employees working in
predominantly or traditionally female jobs.' 36 The expert evidence in-
troduced by the plaintiffs showed a statistically significant inverse corre-
lation between sex and salary. 13 7 When jobs were controlled for skill,
effort, responsibility, and working conditions, so that only jobs of sub-
stantially equal value were compared, the monthly salary of the classifi-
cation decreased by $4.51 for every one percent increase in the female
population of the classification. 13 8 A one hundred percent female job
was paid, on average, $5,400 a year less than a one hundred percent
male job of equivalent value.139 Since the probability of such a relation-
ship occurring by chance is less than one in ten thousand, the court at-
tributed the difference in pay to discrimination.
140
The plaintiffs in AFSCME bolstered these showings with additional
discriminatory evidence based on occupational segregation and classifi-
cation of employees,' 4 ' Equal Pay Act violations, 14 2 wage disparities in
jobs requiring comparable skill levels, 14 3 sex-based deviations from job
evaluation measures in setting wage rates, 144 and admissions by state
officials of discriminatory practices.'
4 5
larly significant under the Title VII principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Teamsters:
"Statistics showing racial . . . imbalance are probative . . . because such imbalance is
often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination, absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory . . . practices will in time result in more or less represen-
tative . . . evidence of long-lasting and gross disparity between them may be signifi-
cant. . . . In many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to
uncover clandestine and covert discrimination." 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
135. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 84-3569 (9th Cir.).
136. 598 F. Supp. at 864.
137. Id. at 863.
138. Brief or Plaintiff of Proposed Findings of Fact and Law at 30, AFSCME v. State of
Wash., 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
139. Brief, supra note 138, at 30.
140. Id. at 33.
141. The state placed classified advertisements in "male only" and "female only" col-
umns in the newspapers. Classification specifications indicated a preference for male or
female employees. 578 F. Supp. at 862-63.
142. Predominantly male jobs were consistently paid more than predominantly female
jobs requiring similar duties, i.e., barber and beautician, institution counselor and classifi-
cation counselor, and duplication service supervisor and data processing supervisor.
Brief, supra note 138, at 12.
!43. Regardless of entry-level requirements for jobs, male jobs at all levels paid more
than female jobs with the same requirements. Male entry-level jobs were paid 16% more
than female entry-level jobs requiring no high school education, 22% more for high
school graduates, 19% more for one year of college, and 13% more for two years of busi-
ness college. Brief, supra note 138, at 31.
144. A series of job evaluation studies updated yearly reflected an increasing across-
the-board disparity (20%-32%) between predominantly male and predominantly female
jobs which required an equivalent composite of skill, effort, responsibility, and working
conditions. No action was taken to correct the situation and only on the eve of trial did the
state pass legislation calling for a 10-year phase-in to correct its discriminatory wage situa-
tion. 578 F. Supp. at 862-63.
145. Successive state governors, personnel boards, and the Governor's Affirmative Ac-
tion Committee admitted that job evaluation studies showed discrimination in compensa-
tion. Id. at 860-62.
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
B. Disparate Impact Wage Discrimination Claims
A second means of proving a sex-based wage discrimination claim is
through application of the traditional Title VII disparate impact doc-
trine. Although some comparable worth advocates discourage the use
of the disparate impact principle for comparable worth litigation,
14 6
foresaking this judicial vehicle would work the demise of the comparable
worth doctrine.
One of the problems perceived with implementing a disparate im-
pact theory for Title VII wage discrimination claims is that this theory of
discrimination focuses on the effect of, and not motivation for, an em-
ployer's policy. 14 7 The reasons why an employer has pursued a given
policy are irrelevant; use of the challenged practice is unlawful unless its
continued use is necessary to the employer's legitimate interest and no
less discriminatory alternatives would meet the employer's needs.14 8 A
literal interpretation of the Equal Pay Act's fourth affirmative defense,
incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett Amendment, 14 9 departs from
this approach. If an employer's practice of setting women'g wages lower
than men's is based on any "factor other than sex," the practice with-
stands an Equal Pay Act or Title VII challenge. It has been argued that
this literal interpretation provides an absolute defense to claims of sex-
based wage discrimination under a disparate impact approach.
150
Notwithstanding this argument, claims of comparable worth should
be brought under the disparate impact theory' 5 1 because the majority of
female workers suffering from covert wage discrimination are unable to
146. See Note, supra note 86, at 1101 ("Although comparable worth impact claims ad-
vance the Title VII policies which the judicially created disparate impact doctrine serves,
they intrude further into employer prerogative and labor-management relations than Con-
gress intended."); Gould, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term:
Justice Brennan 's Term, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 66 (1981) (Gunther conclusively denies a wage-
impact claim under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act); cf. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimina-
tion, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397,
428-57 (1979) (proof of sex-based job segregation establishes a prima facie Title VII
claim); Comment, Equal Pay for Comparable Work, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1980)
(proof of unequal average salaries of male and female workers establishes a disparate im-
pact claim).
147. Bellace, supra note 9, at 686.
148. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
150. See Gould, supra note 70, at 63-74.
151. The following are proposed as the essential elements to a prima facie case of com-
parable worth using the disparate impact approach:
(i) the plaintiff represents workers in a job category which is predominantly
female;
(ii) the employer also employs workers in a job category which is not dominated
by female workers and which requires
(a) comparable work or
(b) substantially similar minimum qualifications of applicants for employ-
ment; and
(iii) workers of plaintiff's job category receive less pay pursuant to the em-
ployer's pay scale.
See Johnson, The Prima Facie Case of Comparable Worth, II OHio N.U.L. REv. 37, 52 (1984).
See also Bellace, supra note 9, at 687 (suggesting a modified disparate impact litigation
model which would require the plaintiff to prove that an evaluation or wage-setting pro-
cess, which is sex neutral on its face, operates to depress the wage rate for women's jobs).
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prove their claims under the disparate treatment theory. 152 Outlawing
only those wages factors openly labeled "sex-based" would allow em-
ployers to segregate jobs by sex and discriminatorily assign values to
those held by women, taking precautions only to avoid explicit use of
sex in assigning those values. Moreover, employers could use market
conditions to establish wages. This practice would fall short of mean-
ingful intent, but would perpetuate the devaluation of female jobs in the
market which results, to some extent, from past discrimination. 153 To
effectuate the remedial scheme of Title VII, no showing of intentional
discrimination should be necessary for women to challenge a purport-
edly neutral practice which discriminatorily determines their wages.
The use of market conditions to set wages is an example of a pur-
portedly "neutral" policy which could be challenged under a Title VII
disparate impact claim. 154 It is argued, however, that Title VII's reme-
dial purpose is not so broad as to make a present employer liable for
employment practices of others or for existing market conditions.
155
For example, in Christensen v. Iowa,15 6 the Eighth Circuit stated it did not
interpret "Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in
setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications."1 5 7 A dis-
parate impact claim was rejected and the employer was allowed to main-
tain a practice of paying clerical workers, who were exclusively female,
less than the amount it paid physical plant workers, who were predomi-
nantly male. The jobs were of equal value to that employer, but did not
command an equal price in the labor market.
158
In Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 15 9 several city-employed
nurses sued in a class action to require the city to pay them the same as
other employees with jobs of comparable value. The city had set its pay
scale according to the market wages of nurses in the community.160 The
nurses argued that their depressed wages were a product of past atti-
tudes and practices; historically nurses were underpaid because their
work was undervalued and because they were almost exclusively wo-
men.161 A market-based pay scale for nurses would perpetuate these
imbalances. Although the gross disparity between wages of nurses and
wages of employees in different jobs of comparable worth evidenced a
152. See Pauley, supra note 36, at 176. Only if the definition of "intent" were given a
more expansive construction to include those acts that are prompted by subconscious be-
liefs regarding the value of women's work, could a disparate treatment theory embrace
such covert discrimination. Id.
153. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., AFSCME v. State of Wash., 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
155. See Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
156. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
157. Id. at 356.
158. The plaintiffs argued that reliance upon prevailing wage rates in determining pay
scales served to carry over the effects of long-standing discriminatory practices in the local
job market, which channeled women workers into a small number of jobs, resulted in an
over-supply of workers and depressed wages in those jobs. Id. at 355-56.
159. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
160. Id. at 229.
161. Id.
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disparate impact which affected women, the Tenth Circuit summarily
disposed of the claim.1
62
A similar approach to a wage discrimination claim under a disparate
impact doctrine was recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Spaulding v.
University of Washington.16 s The court first rejected the predominantly
female nursing faculty's claim of discriminatory underpayment under
the Equal Pay Act and under a Title VII disparate treatment claim. Re-
fusing to infer intent "merely from the existence of wage differences
between jobs that are only similar,"164 the court also rejected a "compa-
rability plus" test which would determine whether discriminatory ani-
mus existed. 1
65
In addition to rejecting the disparate treatment claim, the court de-
nied the nursing faculty's disparate impact claim. The plaintiffs showed
a wage disparity between comparable jobs and showed that the disparate
impact on women was caused by the university's facially neutral policy
or practice of setting wages according to market rates. The court stated
that the disparate impact model was not available to establish a wide-
ranging claim of wage disparity between only comparable jobs. 166 Find-
ing that an employer's reliance on competitive market prices to set
wages does not qualify as a facially neutral policy or practice, the court
noted that employers "deal with the market as a given, and do not mean-
ingfully have a 'policy' about it in the relevant Title VII sense.167
The rationale employed by the courts which have accepted a market
defense and which have rejected a disparate impact theory of liability for
Title VII wage discrimination claims exemplifies the attitude which the
disparate impact doctrine seeks to remedy. 16 8 The social purposes fur-
thered by the disparate impact doctrine should be recognized by the
courts in wage discrimination cases.
First, disparate impact checks covert intentional discrimination. 16 9
Once the Equal Pay Act came into effect, it was evident that overt, sex-
based wage discrimination would subside. As one commentator stated,
"[b]ut whether such practices would be eradicated or merely driven un-
162. Id
163. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984).
164. Id. at 700.
165. Id. The "comparability plus" test required only some degree ofjob comparability
plus some combination of factors including direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimi-
natory conduct and pay disparities. The nursing faculty argued that it would be a sliding
scale where the "plus" factors vary in inverse proportion to the degree of comparability
shown.
166. Id. at 706.
167. Id. at 708. Although the majority disposes of a disparate impact claim, Judge
Schroeder, in a concurring opinion, points out that the nursing faculty never attempted to
show that any of the facially neutral practices of which it complained had a disparate im-
pact on women. She criticizes the majority's analysis as "confusingly mesh[ing] adverse
impact with varying concepts of comparable worth." Thus, she asserts, it is not possible
for the majority "to render any definitive ruling on the validity of comparable worth." Id.
at 710.
168. See generally Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity and Equality,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17 (discussing Griggs and Dothard).
169. See Note, supra note 86, at 1089.
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derground is another question."' 70 Using disparate impact doctrine as
a means to eliminate covert discrimination is especially important in the
setting of wages because, as the Supreme Court has noted, "more often
than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting."'
Second, the disparate impact doctrine alleviates present harm
caused by historical discrimination which cannot be traced to a single
purposeful discriminatory act. 172 Traditionally, society has underval-
ued women's work; the present wage situation aggravates the already
disadvantaged social position of women.1 73 To correct present pay dis-
parities which reflect past discrimination, the impact doctrine would al-
low a plaintiff to demonstrate that she represents workers in a sex-
segregated job who receive lower wages than workers performing work
which is comparable, 174 without having to establish the original "blame-
worthy" act. 1
75
Finally, recognizing a disparate impact claim for sex-based wage
discrimination cases will prevent future remote discrimination.1 76 This
rationale has been discussed primarily in the context cf remedying the
effects of past race discrimination. Specifically, it is recognized that the
injury inflicted by historical discrimination "can place its victims at a dis-
advantage in a variety of future endeavors, and discrimination can also
perpetuate itself by altering the social environment to harm new genera-
tions of victims.' 7 7 Bold enforcement of Title VII will reduce the gap
in job prestige for women and will reduce future prejudice.1
7 8
In order to implement the social policies furthered by the disparate
impact doctrine, the market defense used in Title VII wage discrimina-
tion claims should be rejected. The use of market conditions to estab-
lish wages is not an inherently bad practice, but it must be prohibited
170. Bellace, supra note 9, at 688.
171. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
172. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (citing inferior education in segregated schools as one rea-
son why blacks were less likely to pass the employer's tests).
173. See Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 540, 558 n.99 (1977). See also M. Griffiths, Can We Still Afford Occupational Segregation?
Some Remarks in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 7-14 (M. Blaxall, B. Reagan eds. 1976) for a
discussion of the argument which men have used to claim the best jobs and the most pay:
men are breadwinners and women are wives or widows; men provide necessary incomes
for their families, but women do not; women and families are supported by men, not wo-
men. The author points out that the supposition is not true, women work because of
economic need, just as men do. Two-thirds of all women workers are either single, di-
vorced, widowed, or separated, or have husbands who earn less than $7,000 per year. Id.
at 7-9.
174. See supra note 151.
175. See Note, supra note 86, at 1090.
176. Brest, supra note 173, at 43.
177. Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscriminative Prin-
ciple, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1976); see also Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505
(D.C. Va. 1968) (differences in compensation which result from earlier hiring discrimina-
tion against a protected group for protected jobs are prohibited by Title VII).
178. See generally J. Bernard, The Historical Roots of Occupational Segregation in WOMEN AND
THE WORKPLACE (M. Blaxall, B. Reagan eds. 1976) 87, 93 (suggestions for occupational
nonsegregation and a sex-fair distribution of work).
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when market conditions do not reflect the true value of thejob.17 9 Title
VII does not require employees to ignore the interaction of supply and
demand, it simply prohibits the use of the market as justification for per-
petuating sex-based wage discrimination. For example, Title VII and
public policy prohibit employers from using the high unemployment
rate of blacks to justify paying black workers less than white workers. 180
The oversupply of black workers is no defense to discrimination. Con-
sequently, employers must also be prohibited from using the same mar-
ket argument to exploit women workers.' 8 ' The argument that fails in
race discrimination cases cannot succeed in sex discrimination cases.
Setting wage rates as a result of market conditions, in effect, means
that each employer will pay only what other employers are willing to
pay. 18 2 When the market rate reflects discriminatory factors, then the
market defense will only perpetuate discrimination by transferring it
from one employer to another.' 83 Market wages should not be the only
standard used to judge the relative worth of jobs. 184 In order to end
wage discrimination, be it sex or race, policy intervention is necessary to
alter the market outcome.' 8 5
An employer's reliance on the market rate to determine wage rates
for women workers was rejected as a defense to Equal Pay Act violations
by the Supreme Court over a decade ago. 186 In Coming Glass, the
Supreme Court explicitly established that the market is not a factor
other than sex. Courts have continued to find that the market is not a
defense to sex-based wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act.' 8 7
Because the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses are incorporated into
Title VII, Coming Glass and the case law addressing the market defense
should have equal vitality in Title VII litigation. There is no legal justifi-
cation for denying the market defense in Equal Pay Act cases while ac-
cepting it in Title VII cases.
Although pre-Gunther cases accepted market conditions as a factor
179. Pauley, supra note 36, at 186.
180. Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at 36.
181. Id.
182. Statements on Pay Equity Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984)
(statement by Brian Turner, Nat'l Comm. on Pay Equity at G-7 [hereinafter cited as State-
ments on Pay Equity].
183. Id. See also WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 54, at 60 ("By use of the 'going
wage' as a standard to set pay rates the wages of a (non-discriminating) firm will be biased
by the discrimination of other firms in the market.").
184. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 54, at 65.
185. Id.
186. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. 188. See also supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
187. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978), where the Court of Appeals stated: "This evidence leads convincingly
to the conclusion that the contrast in pay is a consequence of the historical willingness of
women to accept inferior financial awards for equivalent work-precisely the outmoded
practice which the Equal Pay Act sought to eradicate." See also Hodgson v. Brookhaven
Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Clearly the fact that the employer's bar-
gaining power is greater with respect to women than with respect to men is not the kind of
factor . . . Congress had in mind.").
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other than sex in Title VII disparate impact cases, 188 recent cases have
rejected it. 189 In Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee,190 the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected sex-segregated actuarial tables in deferred compensation
plans and ordered the state to pay female retirees benefits equal to those
paid to similarly situated male retirees. The state argued that such plans
reflect limits in the marketplace and constituted a restriction not of the
state's making.191 The court, in rejecting this argument, stated: "Title
VII has never been construed to allow an employer to maintain a dis-
criminatory practice merely because it reflects the marketplace ... .1192
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit decision 19 3 holding
that it would be inconsistent with Title VII to find that an employer, who
adopts a discriminatory fringe benefit plan, can avoid liability on the
ground that all plans in the open market are discriminatory. The Court
stated that an employer who confronts such a situation must either sup-
ply the fringe benefit himself, free from market discrimination, or not
provide it at all.
194
In cases other than where the market is used as a defense, purport-
edly "neutral" employer policies affecting wages have been successfully
challenged under a Title VII disparate impact theory. In a race-based
wage discrimination claim, a disparate impact theory was used to chal-
lenge an employer's classification and pay scheme. Black employees in
Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co.,195 claimed that an employer's use of a
"leadman" classification resulted in wage discrimination against them
since leadmen were predominantly white. Approximately 60% of the
higher paid leadmen positions were held by white employees; the work
force from which they were chosen was 80% black. Recognizing that the
additional duties required of leadmen were insignificant, 196 the plaintiffs
argued that the employer classified the leadman position as a manage-
ment position to enable the employer to pay white employees more than
black employees for comparable work. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recognized that the challenge to the classification scheme stated a
cause of action for wage discrimination under the disparate impact
theory.
Similarly, the disparate impact analysis has been used to challenge
purportedly "neutral" employment policies causing sex-based wage dis-
188. Sep Lemons v. City and Cty. of Denver. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980): Christensen
v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
189. Contra Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
190. 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982).
191. Id. at 335.
192. Id.
193. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
with regard to the violation of Title VII, but reversed, in part. the holding applying retro-
active relief.
194. Id. at 1083.
195. 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980).
196. As the evidence in the record about the supervisory nature of the leadman posi-
tion was highly contradictory, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
determine the extent of the leadman's responsibilities. Id. at 701.
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crimination. In Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., 1 9 7 a Title VII equal pay
case, it was argued that a company's method of computing wages consti-
tuted unlawful sex discrimination where a minimum salary guaranteed
to starting employees was based, in part, on the employee's prior salary.
A result of the practice was that, on the average, the female employees
made less than their male counterparts. The court expressed concern
that using a factor such as prior salary to set wages could easily be
manipulated by employers to capitalize on the unfairly low salaries his-
torically paid to women. 198 It held that "an employer thus cannot use a
factor which causes a wage differential between male and female em-
ployees absent an acceptable business reason." 199
In Wambheim v. J. C. Penney Co. ,200 the Court held that the disparate
impact analysis was appropriate in an action alleging that an employer's
medical insurance policy discriminated against women with respect to
compensation. The court found that the employer's "head-of-house-
hold" rule allowing dependent coverage for a spouse only if the em-
ployee earned more than half of the couple's combined income, had a
disparate impact on women, most of whom were in low-paying
positions.
Finally, in AFSCME, a disparate impact claim was allowed to chal-
lenge the state's policy of paying female job classifications twenty per-
cent less than employees in predominantly male job classifications that
required an equivalent or lesser composite of skill, effort, responsibility,
and working conditions.
20 1
Allowing the Title VII disparate impact doctrine in wage discrimina-
tion cases does not call for a novel approach to Title VII. Rather, em-
ployers merely are held liable for acts of overt and covert discrimination.
The eradication of sex-based wage discrimination should involve appli-
cation of traditional Title VII burdens, standards, and means of proof
which have successfully gained a foothold in the elimination of discrimi-
nation in other contexts.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPARABLE WORTH
Comparable worth has received considerable attention lately from
Congress, state legislatures, and labor unions. 20 2 Advocates rest wo-
197. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
198. Id. at 876. See also Neely v. MARTA, 641 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1981) (disparate im-
pact analysis applied to company rule requiring prior management approval for starting
salaries of employees that exceeded their prior salary by 10%); Futran v. RING Radio Co.,
501 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (expressing concern that the use of prior salary would
perpetuate the traditionally lower salaries paid to women).
199. 691 F.2d at 876.
200. 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3544 (1984).
201. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983). See also supra notes 135-45 and accompany-
ing text.
202. Comparable worth has received very little attention from the EEOC under the
Reagan Administration. This marks a drastic change from action by the EEOC under the
Carter Administration which filed an amicus curiae brief in Gunther, brought many lawsuits,
and commissioned the NAS study on comparable worth. The Reagan Administration has
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men's economic survival on the adoption of a comparable worth
scheme. Opponents charge that nationwide adoption of comparable
worth will be costly and disruptive to the free market system.
A. Market Justifications
Comparable worth opponents argue that the free market system will
be disrupted if a comparable worth system is established because wages
are determined by the interaction of neutral forces of the supply of
workers and the demand for their skills. 20 3 However, it has been argued
that the factors of supply and demand have little, if any, impact on
predominantly female occupations. 20 4 Cited as support for this propo-
sition is the long-term nurse shortage where salaries did not rise to
match the unmet demand for nurses. Rather than pay American nurses
a fair wage, hospitals resorted to recruiting nurses from the Philippines
who would gladly accept depressed wages.
20 5
The claim that new social reforms will destroy the American free
market system has been espoused at various times throughout the his-
tory of labor legislation. For example, in the 1880's Massachusetts em-
ployers testified that a new piece of legislation would destroy the
employer-employee relationship, cause chaos in production, force em-
ployees to relocate their businesses in areas where the legislation was
more favorable, and lead to the spread of socialism.20 6 This portentous
legislation was the Child Labor Law, which prohibited children from
working more than eight hours a day.
Interference in the free market system to achieve important social
goals has been a common congressional practice. This is illustrated by
legislative efforts to protect laborers in a variety of ways through child
labor laws, health laws, minimum wage laws, and equal pay laws. Simi-
larly, unions attempt to circumvent the free market system to achieve
their goals. By engaging in collective bargaining, these organizations
directly influence the wages paid to their members rather than relying
solely on the neutral forces of supply and demand.
The United States does not have an unfettered market system. The
fact that comparable worth opponents cling to market conditions as jus-
tification for denying comparable worth claims merely camouflages sex-
based wage discrimination.
recently taken a strong stand to defeat comparable worth. See Siniscalco & Remmers, supra
note 119, at 223. Recently, the EEOC has been the object of a frontal attack by Congress
for its inaction in sex-based wage discrimination claims other than straight Equal Pay Act
cases. See HOUSE COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS, Pay Equity: EEOC's Handling of Sex-Based
Wage Discrimination Complaints, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
203. See, e.g., J. O'NEILL, An Economic Perspective: An Argument Against Comparable Worth,
supra note 4, at 27; Comparable Worth-Part 1: A Theory With No Facts, BACKGROUNDER,
March 2, 1984.
204. Statements on Pay Equity, supra note 186 (citing E. BRANDERS, 4 HISTORY OF LABOR
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B. Cost Justifications
The cost of correcting sex-based wage discrimination cited by em-
ployers20 7 does not justify the cost of discrimination to the individual
and society.20 8 So great are the disparities between men's and women's
current wage rates, that employers are concerned that the establishment
of equity will be too burdensome for the economy to bear.
20 9
Congress has never placed a price tag on the cost of correcting dis-
crimination in employment.2 10 In enacting the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act of 1978 under Title VII, 211 Congress acknowledged that
requiring employers to cover pregnancy on the same terms as other dis-
abilities would raise their total costs by approximately $200 million, but
discussed this factor and determined that the Act was necessary "to clar-
ify [the] original intent" of Title VII.
2 12
Similarly, in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,
2 13
the Supreme Court stated that the cost of correcting discrimination is no
justification for violating title VII. 214 The Court rejected the city's argu-
ment that the costs of equal treatment in employee retirement plans
would be too great and found that the city was not justified in charging
women more than men for pension premiums. In Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,2 15 the Supreme Court stated that
although the cost of providing complete health insurance coverage for
the dependents of male employees, including pregnant wives, might ex-
207. See, e.g., AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 867. The state argued that the tremendous
costs involved, lack of revenue in a depressed economy, and prior state revenue commit-
ments were reasons why injunctive relief to correct wage discrimination should be denied.
208. See generally Sawhill, Discrimination and Poverty Among Women Who Head Families in
WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 201 (M. Blaxall, B. Reagan eds. 1976) (labor market discrimi-
nation and occupational segregation are factors which contribute to the poverty level of
families headed by women; the elimination of sex discrimination alone would improve
their economic status and there would be far less poverty and welfare dependency among
these families).
209. See S. MITCHELL, Comparable Worth: Unchartered & Treacherous Waters, supra note 4, at
51-57. The commentator states:
• . . [C]omparable worth is unnecessary, ill-conceived, premature, vague and
unintelligible, and it will impose an enormous burden on employers, taxpayers
and unions with currently productive collective bargaining relationships. One in-
dication of the cost is the federal court judgment [AFSCME] handed down in
December, 1983 against the State of Washington on an intentional sex-discrimi-
nation theory. Commentators have estimated that back pay in that case could
amount to $500 million, while estimates for pay adjustments necessary to comply
with the judge's notion of comparable worth may amount to another $5 million.
In Illinois, a similar judgment would require a 1% increase in the individual State
income tax, or $300.00 more on taxes for a family with an income of $30,000.00.
Applied to private employers, no reliable estimates of costs exist, but they would
be considerably larger.
Id. at 57.
210. Pauley, supra note 36, at 186.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
212. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1978), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4749 (1978).
213. 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978).
214. Id. "That argument might prevail if Title VII contained a cost-justification defense
comparable to the affirmative defense in a price discrimination suit. But neither Congress
nor the courts have recognized such a defense under Title VII." Id.
215. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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ceed the cost of preventing such coverage for the dependents of female
employees, no such cost justification is recognized under Title VII once
discrimination has been shown.2 16 And, in Liberles v. County of Cook,
2 17
the Seventh Circuit stated: "The desire, however laudable, of county
and state employers to save money does not bear a manifest relationship
to the . . . compensation of predominantly female job classifications."
The argument that remedying disparate treatment and impact
would impose heavy costs on institutions and individuals was also re-
jected in the race discrimination context with respect to suspension of
voting tests, invalidating employment tests, and massive busing reme-
dies for school segregation. 2  Similarly, the prohibitive costs of elimi-
nating sex-based wage discrimination should not be used to justify
denying female employees their full Title VII rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come to recognize the comparable worth theory as an
appropriate vehicle for proving sex-based wage discrimination under Ti-
tle VII. Comparable worth claims are entitled to the same remedies as
any other Title VII claim and should be analyzed under both disparate
treatment and disparate impact.
The time has come to acknowledge that the wage gap does exist and
results, in part, from the historical devaluation and segregation of wo-
men's work. Although non-discriminatory factors affect the wage gap,
there still remains a significant portion of the gap that cannot be attrib-
uted to any factor. Logic demands the acknowledgment that this unex-
plained differential results from sex-based discrimination. In order to
eradicate sex-based discrimination, job evaluation studies must be used
to determine the size of the unexplained differential within each individ-
ual organization.
The time has come to move forward toward equality for women.
No longer can we continue to have a national policy forbidding employ-
ment discrimination while at the same time protecting employers in
their efforts to pay women unequal wages for work of comparable or
equal value. Women are calling for a uniform policy-one that prohibits
sex-based discrimination in the same breadth as race-based discrimina-
tion and makes no remedial distinctions. We have the tool-Title VII
expressly prohibits employment discrimination based on race and sex
classifications. All that is needed is the courage to take the next step
toward pay equity for all working women.
Diana Fields
Kathryn Morrison
216. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1982) ("It shall not be a defense under Title VII to
a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with
respect to one sex than the other.").
217. 709 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1983).
218. See Brest, supra note 173, at 36-43, for a discussion of the benefits and costs of
eliminating racially disproportionate impact.
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